Introduction

Wonder: a starting point—a category for investigation?

There are many different senses in which one might talk of a philosopher’s starting point, and of what it means to look for it. But surely one of the most important senses is that in which Aristotle spoke of wonder as the beginning of all philosophy—“it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize”—picking up in his Metaphysics on Plato’s earlier remarks in the Theaetetus: “this feeling—a sense of wonder—is perfectly proper to a philosopher: philosophy has no other foundation.”¹

Both remarks were set to reverberate throughout later philosophical tradition and become a staple in its self-understanding. Yet there is clearly no one kind of wonder from which philosophy begins, any more than there is one single question with which philosophy would rightly be occupied. This is already evident from the contrast between the wonder on which Aristotle’s and Plato’s remarks are respectively focused—the one a wonder characterising men’s outwardly-turned gaze to the cosmos and unexplained natural phenomena, the other a wonder provoked by conceptual phenomena and arising through the complex manoeuvres of Socratic dialogue (and thus, we may remark, one already internal to philosophical activity). Aristotle’s, it has been said more generally, is a wonder that seeks to explain, and after supplying inquiry with its beginning seeks its own dissolution; Plato’s a wonder that also accompanies inquiry as its affective tone and indeed stands not only at its beginning but at its end, informing the reverential vision it seeks out.²

² See the discussion in Sylvana Chrysakopoulou, “Wonder and the beginning of philosophy in Plato,” in S. Vasalou, ed., Practices of Wonder: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, forthcoming); and for further nuance Andrea W. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Epilogue, esp. 257 ff. See also on this point Mary-Jane Rubenstein,
That philosophy can take its beginning from a wonder belonging to
different kinds, similarly, is a proposition to which Schopenhauer, who was
familiar with the remarks of both of his predecessors, would extend his own
support when qualifying the motivating passion of inquiry in his main work.
For the “more specific character ... of the astonishment that urges us to
philosophise,” he would write in the World as Will and Representation, is “at
top one that is dismayed and distressed.” And the reason for this,
Schopenhauer would suggest, is because it receives its fundamental
provocation from the spectacle of suffering, and human evil.³ Here, indeed, we
may no longer be comfortable speaking of wonder, and like Schopenhauer’s
translator E. F. J. Payne—who exhibited some vacillation between translating
the same word (Verwunderung) now as “wonder,” now as “astonishment”—we
may need to talk, with Schopenhauer, of an astonishment; an estrangement; a
kind of horror.

Yet even if we recognise that particular philosophies and individual
philosophers take their starting point and are carried forward within their
inquiry by responses of wonder, or astonishment, or perplexity which are
different in kind and object, it might now be queried whether anything
substantial could be gained by posing a systematic question concerning the
type of astonishment at work in a particular philosopher’s undertaking. For
passions might stimulate inquiry, and passions might sustain it, but an
investigation of these passions would seem vacuous or otiose, deflecting our
attention from the content of the inquiry itself which ought to form the real
object of our investigation. It might thus appear doubtful that a concern with
the specific character of a thinker’s astonishment—whether the astonishment
he begins from, the astonishment he seeks to produce, or indeed the false
astonishment he seeks to dispel—could function as a meaningful handle for
investigation.

That an explicit concern with wonder can, however, serve in such a
meaningful role, is a view that has begun to receive growing support in recent
times, through a variety of works that have taken wonder, and a concern with
the different kinds of wonder, as a category for approaching their subjects. One
thinks of Lorraine Daston’s and Katharine Park’s magisterial history, Wonders
and the Order of Nature (2001), which plots the changing place of wonder in
science and philosophy between the High Middle Ages and the Enlightenment,
and in doing so tracks important intellectual transformations, notably in the
practice of scientific inquiry. In philosophy, one thinks more recently of Mary-
Jane Rubenstein’s Strange Wonder (2008), which focuses on the renegotiation
of wonder by Heidegger and his successors, and shows the renegotiation of the

grounding mood of philosophy to be twinned to a deeper reconsideration of its task.

There are philosophers, to be sure, who have been preoccupied with the mood of their activity more strongly than others. Among recent philosophers, Heidegger is a case in point. Wittgenstein is another, for a concern with wonder would appear as a leitmotif in his later philosophy, and it would do so in the context of a similar preoccupation with the need to re-orient philosophical inquiry and define its proper standpoint. The concern with wonder would thus be therapeutic in kind, aiming to heal false forms of philosophical wonder—the tendency, for example, to shroud the workings of the mind in an aura of mystique thick with its own presuppositions—and to promote a truer wonder directed to those things that are precisely “hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity” (PI §129), such as the phenomena of ordinary language. With Heidegger, with Wittgenstein, with Plato, an explicit thematisation of philosophical mood would seem to promise itself as a fruitful grip. What, then, of Schopenhauer?

It will be one of the main tasks of the work that follows to suggest that a concern with the specific character of Schopenhauer’s philosophical wonder forms an illuminating category through which to calibrate the way we read his philosophy; and that it offers an equally important handle for deciding how to engage it. For in seeking to engage Schopenhauer’s philosophy, commentators have often found themselves faced with a recurring predicament, one that no doubt mirrors a more general predicament with which the history of the philosophy confronts its readers, yet which in Schopenhauer’s case seems to surface with particular tenacity. In approaching philosophers of the past, we are often naturally driven toward an effort to draw them into a conversation that will take place in our language, one that will speak to our concerns and answer to our standards. And in the context of present-day philosophy, this has often meant: standards in which the quality of argument carries the strongest privilege.

It is this prevailing understanding of philosophical excellence that has been expressed in many of the most distinguished efforts to engage Schopenhauer philosophically in the recent past; one thinks of the work of D.W. Hamlyn, Bryan Magee, Christopher Janaway, or Julian Young, to mention but a few. The focus, within such efforts, has often fallen on core aspects of Schopenhauer’s philosophical scheme, to take these critically to task and assess them for their coherence or justificatory force. Yet it is an approach that has often appeared to be brought into tension by the success of its own techniques, which reveal Schopenhauer’s claims to be vulnerable to multiple stress fractures upon the lightest probing. And in placing the coherence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in doubt, such approaches simultaneously raise a question concerning Schopenhauer’s claim to serious philosophical attention,

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and to gaining a hearing from a contemporary audience that has after all many contenders among whom it must distribute its finite energies.

This has not been the sole type of reading that Schopenhauer’s works have called forth, and there has been a different body of reactions, more motley in kind and intellectual orientation, which have often shared few positive features other than attesting an attunement to Schopenhauer’s philosophy in which the quality of its argument is not the most important concern. One thinks, here, of shorter glosses like Iris Murdoch’s meditative discussion of Schopenhauer in her Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, or Terry Eagleton’s fiery account in The Ideology of the Aesthetic. One thinks, likewise, of some of the later works of his German readers, such as Rüdiger Safranski’s compassionate biography or Arthur Hübscher’s scrupulous yet wistfully admiring intellectual history. One thinks, inescapably, of the impassioned and mercurial reactions of Schopenhauer’s best-known reader, Nietzsche.5

It is against the background of this larger question about how the philosophy of Schopenhauer should be engaged that the present study unfolds, and its task can be understood as an effort to spell out more explicitly this alternative type of attunement. Or more accurately, and more modestly: to spell out what I take to be one of the most illuminating ways of specifying it—and this, indeed, is as an attunement to a wonder of a very particular kind. My main argument rests in the simple claim that Schopenhauer’s philosophical practice, to be adequately characterised, needs to be located within the framework that his own aesthetics makes available, and more specifically, within that particular aspect of his aesthetics that consists in the experience of the sublime. Schopenhauer’s philosophical standpoint can be understood as an exercise in vision which Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the sublime—with its peculiar configuration of the terrible and the exulting, and its peculiar constitutive insight—provides us with the best structure for approaching.

Locating Schopenhauer’s standpoint in this context, I will argue, allows us to place his philosophical undertaking in clearer light on many levels. It allows us to understand the philosophical subject that Schopenhauer’s work constructs for itself, and to thematise revealingly the relationship between the subject and the content of its philosophical representation. It allows us to grasp the task of philosophy more distinctly and to rewrite it as one that has a therapeutic of wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic of the subjectivity that underpins them. It allows us, similarly, to recognise the dialectic of pride and vulnerability as the subtext and affective backbone of Schopenhauer’s philosophical undertaking. And it

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allows us, finally, to understand our own reactions to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, despite or indeed because of its terrible content.

With this reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophical vantage point in place, one may confront in new terms the question concerning how this this vantage point stands to be constructively engaged. My proposal will be that for this to be done, Schopenhauer’s standpoint needs to be anchored in a broader context, and to be aligned with an epistemic ideal boasting a longer philosophical lineage. More specifically, the vantage point *sub specie aeternitatis* that Schopenhauer constructs in his work needs to be connected to a privileged notion of ascent that been etched deeply in the thinking of ancient philosophers—among Platonists, Stoics and Epicureans—and had found direct expression in the imaginary of “flights of the soul” and in the more programmatic cultivation of what Pierre Hadot has described as a “view from above” or “cosmic consciousness.” Connecting Schopenhauer’s standpoint to this history, however, involves connecting it to a strongly ethical context, given the profound ethical significance and indeed transformative power with which the occupation of this standpoint was vested in ancient philosophy.

Yet it is more specifically, I will argue, the thick ligaments tying this standpoint to one particular element of the ancient ethical outlook—namely, to the virtue of greatness of soul or *megalopsychia*—that provide us with the richest resources for approaching Schopenhauer’s standpoint. It is an approach that would offer itself as an appropriation conditioned by critique, seeking to place Schopenhauer in a kind of dialogue with the ancient ethical tradition that responds to Alasdair MacIntyre’s understanding of the “continuities of argument” which constitute traditions in general. Locating Schopenhauer’s vantage point within this longer tradition enables us, on the one hand, to articulate the value of this standpoint more clearly and thus find the motives for its appropriation, tying its value to its capacity as a location of self-knowledge. At the same time, it enables us to critically approach Schopenhauer’s specific articulation of this standpoint as an expression of ethical choice, and of a specific kind of character—a character for whom self-knowledge is sterile, for whom the “view from above” is constituted as a “view from nowhere,” for whom ascent fails to lead to re-descent and re-engagement. And to the extent that Schopenhauer’s modification of the ancient standpoint is in great part our own—a modified standpoint expressing, it has often been said, the “homelessness” of a newly disenchanted, freshly secularised world—to critique its character is to open the possibility of asking how this peculiarly modern space can be differently negotiated. My own proposal, located against MacIntyre’s revisionary account of the virtues, will take the form of an argument (or an adumbration of one) that the ancient philosophical understanding of greatness of soul, taken as a character trait that regulates the attitudes of hope and despair with which we respond to epistemic uncertainty, offers itself precisely as an ethical ideal for negotiating that space.
What follows is a brief overview of the stages of the argument chapter by chapter. The main task of the first chapter is to set the stage by providing an overview of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, focusing on the characterisation of Schopenhauer’s standpoint as “subjective” or “inward-looking,” and singling out Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic experience for special attention. Chapter 2 launches into the main argument taking as a point of departure Schopenhauer’s discussion of the fear of death and his proposal for resolving it. A closer examination of Schopenhauer’s discussion reveals the presence of an “objective” or “outward-looking” standpoint within his account, one that is rich in visual elements and carries more positive valence than Schopenhauer’s programmatic avowal of the subjective standpoint of philosophy prepares us to assume. Studied more carefully, this objective standpoint turns out to be affiliated to the privileged mode of surveying that Schopenhauer understood as aesthetic in kind. The conclusion that Schopenhauer’s philosophical standpoint participates in the aesthetic is supported by a more systematic survey of the evidence, including the so-called “argument” from analogy that plays a pivotal role in Schopenhauer’s development of his metaphysical position.

Chapter 3 picks up where the previous chapter left off to qualify its reading further, focusing on a narrower set of “physiognomic” features within Schopenhauer’s work which construct a philosophical standpoint offering a holistic representation of the world in its infinite vastness from a location seemingly outside it. This standpoint, I argue, stands to be linked with Schopenhauer’s discussion of the sublime, and participates in its basic structure, in which the mind overcomes the world through an act of understanding that reveals the world in its dependence, and the mind as the true object of sublimity. In the double act of cognising the world and pronouncing judgement on it—“it ought not to be”—the mind asserts its dominion over the world to which it had formerly appeared vulnerable. This understanding of Schopenhauer’s standpoint, which meshes with a privileging of the notions of “height” and “ascent” pervasive in Schopenhauer’s outlook, reveals the philosophical subject in a transformed identity in which the embedded viewpoint of individuality has been transcended.

Chapter 4 turns to confront the question how Schopenhauer’s philosophy stands to be most fruitfully approached. Having placed this question in the framework of a larger concern with the way we approach philosophers of the past, I offer a conspectus of some of the most important recent efforts to engage Schopenhauer philosophically for an English-speaking audience, and of the challenges these have faced given the limitations of Schopenhauer’s arguments and of his positions considered as rationally justified claims. Yet these limitations, I suggest, on the one hand need to be located against Schopenhauer’s own disavowal of argument in his philosophical method and conception of philosophical excellence. On the other hand, they point us to another way of reading Schopenhauer’s claims, namely as expressive in nature, both in the narrower sense of an expression of personal
character, but also in the broader sense of an expression of far-reaching social and spiritual conditions that still define our present. A closer critical examination of the content and grounds of Schopenhauer’s pessimism provides further evidence in this regard.

With this ground covered, chapter 5 restates the question—how (why) read Schopenhauer?—and proposes to look for an answer specified in ethical terms. After considering some prominent ethical readings Schopenhauer’s philosophy has received in the past and addressing their peculiar challenges, I suggest that a more promising way of approaching Schopenhauer ethically can be identified by looking toward the aesthetic reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy offered, and more specifically toward its “sublime” vantage point. Yet this requires that we connect this vantage point to one receiving wide expression in ancient philosophy, where the notion of “ascent” had carried a similar privilege, surfacing in the works of Plato and his successors among the Stoics and Epicureans with varying degrees of distinctness and strength as an imaginary of cosmic flight or holistic representation. This imaginary, and the capacity for moral and intellectual transcendence revealed in it, was in turn linked to the ethical ideal of grandeur or greatness of soul. It is this ideal, I suggest, that provides us with the resources for a critique of Schopenhauer’s standpoint, one that presents itself as a critique of its ethical character.

It is the task of chapter 6 to place this critique within the horizon of an appropriation, and to articulate an alternative ethical proposal in positive terms. This proposal rests on taking the core tension to lie in the notion of dignity or self-esteem, and to centre on a dialectic between mastery and vulnerability that is a dialectic between pride and humiliation. Schopenhauer’s philosophical decisions, in such terms, can be read as expressions of a desire for mastery that involves an intolerance of vulnerability and its enforced passivity. An alternative decision would lie in a different negotiation of vulnerability, and of the dialectic of dependence and transcendence, and would include an embrace of epistemic vulnerability directly opposed to the intellectual closure typifying Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Opened up by such an act of intellectual humility, the philosophical vantage point sub specie aeternitatis becomes a space in which different responses are possible. Looking to the tradition of greatness of soul can enable us to articulate more distinctly the notion of hope—a hope for the good that I follow MacIntyre in understanding as a quest for the good—as the content of an alternative way of responding, and as a virtue whose exercise might allow this vantage point to fully regain its ancient character as a location for “questing” and self-knowledge.